Why should the Norwegian Armed Forces care about climate change? by Skeie, Johanne Jensen
© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2019. ISSN 1894-4795
IFS Insights 11-12/2020




• Climate change is a “threat multiplier” due 
to its ability to amplify existing security 
challenges and threats. It is likely to affect 
the military as an institution and organiza-
tion, including installations and equipment, 
as well as operations and the character of 
warfare. Hence, it is an all-encompassing 
threat factor that needs to be taken into ac-
count in long-term security projections and 
defense planning.
• Climate change may also be a direct threat 
to the military itself, as the moral justifica-
tion and room of operability in the public 
sphere may shrink if other ministries, of-
ficial bodies and areas of politics are forced 
to cut back due to climate change.
• Among the broad spectrum of aspects cli-
mate change is likely to affect is aircraft 
performance due to rising temperatures, 
potentially cause a necessary move of mili-
tary bases in exposed geographical locati-
ons, as well as open up a new area of great 
power rivalry in the Arctic due to accelera-
ted rate of climate change and the melting 
of sea ice.
• There are basic knowledge gaps regar-
ding how climate change will affect the 
Norwegian Armed Forces, including in 
international operations, as well as how 
climate change will affect security coope-
ration and security alliances such as NATO, 
which requires further research.
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security implications, and researchers often 
include the idea of the threat multiplier.3 
Climate change is described as a threat 
multiplier due to its ability to amplify instability 
in unstable regions and adding tension in more 
stable regions.4 Climate change is not seen as 
something that will necessarily create new 
security problems, but rather intensify existing 
insecurity.5 Also, the Norwegian Armed Forces 
Long Term Plan recognizes this concept 
and includes the characterization of climate 
change as a threat multiplier, and states that 
it may both cause and worsen conflicts due to 
“drought, desertification, melting ice and rising 
sea levels, flooding and storms, in addition 
to scarce access to natural resources such as 
water and earth”.6 
The term threat multiplier is useful because 
it becomes a shorthand for the numerous 
possible consequences of climate change. The 
concept embraces the uncertainty inherent 
to predicting the future of climate change. 
There is “robust evidence, high agreement” 
according to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) report that “[h]uman 
security will be progressively threatened as 
the climate changes”.7 There are variations of 
medium evidence, medium to high agreement 
surrounding claims that climate change will 
impact many factors.8 This includes migration 
flows, factors increasing risk of violent conflict 
within states, leading to new challenges and 
shaping conditions of security and national 
3 Examples include: Causevic, 2017: 60; Alex & Estève, 2018: 98; 
Werrell & Femia, 2016: 221; Brzoska, 2012: 44; Brock et al., 2020: 
12
4 Werrell & Femia, 2016: 221; Mazo, 2010: 32
5 CNA Corporation, 2007: 6
6 Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020b: 42, author’s own translation if 
not stated otherwise.
7 Agder et al., 2014: 758
8 Agder et al., 2014: 758
Climate simulations published in May 2020 
predict that the Arctic will be “practically sea-
ice free” for the first time before September 
2050, a mere thirty years away.1 How could this 
climate change prediction affect Norwegian 
security and defense? 
In both the April and October 2020 drafts 
of the Norwegian Armed Forces Long Term 
Plan for 2021-2024, climate change is one of 
many key long-term trends that may influence 
Norwegian security and defense ability.2 This 
is the first time the international and national 
security and defense implications of climate 
change have been included in the Long Term 
Plan for the Norwegian Armed Forces, and it 
is an indication of the rising importance of 
climate change implications in security and 
defense discourse. This article examines why 
the Norwegian Armed Forces should care about 
climate change. First, it considers and explains 
the concept of climate change as a “threat 
multiplier” in the full spectrum of security 
challenges and threats. Second, it examines 
areas of interest pertaining to climate change 
and its impact on security that is relevant to 
the Norwegian Armed Forces: (1) the military 
as an institution, (2) military installations 
and equipment, (3) armed conflict, (4) Arctic 
security, and (5) NATO. Finally, it identifies 
key potential impacts of climate change on 
the Norwegian Armed Forces in international 
operations, and other knowledge gaps that 
should be further investigated.
Climate change as a “threat multiplier”
There is a wide array of research areas in the 
academic literature on climate change and 
1 Notz et al, 2020: 1
2 Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020a: 11, 39-40; 
Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020b: 11, 42
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security policies.9 Potential climate change 
impacts on military bases include “recurrent 
flooding”, “drought”, “desertification”, 
“wildfires”, and “thawing permafrost”.10 These 
impacts are both current and future dangers to 
base operability.11
There is also a risk that the effect of climate 
change on conflicts or instability is being 
“downgraded or ignored out of a mistaken 
belief that environmental causes somehow 
absolve individuals and governments from 
responsibility of their actions”.12 Designating 
climate change as a threat multiplier helps 
to indicate the severity of the climate change 
challenge in a security and defense context, and 
its potential role in exacerbating instability. For 
instance, Ban Ki-moon, the former secretary 
general of the United Nations, wrote in The 
Washington Post: “Amid the diverse social and 
political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an 
ecological crisis, arising at least in part from 
climate change”, partly attributing the conflict 
to climate change effects.13 His assessment 
referred to research results of anthropologist 
Alex De Waal who examined the Darfur conflict 
in the 1980s.14
However, there are arguments against using 
the concept of “threat multiplier” in order 
to describe the potential security effects of 
climate change, as it is seen as simplistic by 
some. Alex De Waal, considered one of the 
foremost experts on Sudan and the Horn of 
Africa15  refuted that the conflict in Darfur was 
due to climate change, and wrote:
Ban Ki-moon’s linking of climate change 
and the Darfur crisis is simplistic. Climate 
change causes livelihood change, which in 
turn causes disputes. Social institutions can 
handle these conflicts and settle them in a 
non-violent manner – it is mismanagement 
 
9 Agder et al., 2014: 758
10 United States Department of Defense (DoD), 2019: 5-7
11 DoD, 2019: 5-7
12 Mazo, 2010: 35
13 Ban, 2007
14 Mazo, 2010: 34
15 Tufts University, 2020
 and militarization that cause war and mas-
sacre.16
There is a “danger of assuming a simplistic, 
deterministic connection” between 
environmental events and effects, and conflict 
and security issues.17 There is a middle ground, 
and the threat multiplier concept opens for 
this. Unfortunately, there is little discussion 
around the term itself, beyond stating in 
various ways that climate change is a threat 
multiplier.18
Some discussion has been raised by Joshua 
Busby and Nina von Uexkull, who argued in 
2018 that it is not helpful to categorize climate 
change as a threat multiplier unless “we know 
the characteristics that make countries more 
likely to experience instability”.19 They find 
that three factors make a country especially 
vulnerable to climate change: (1) “high level of 
dependence on agriculture”, (2) a recent history 
of conflict”, and (3) “discriminatory political 
institutions”.20 Busby advocates in 2020 
identifying a set of “commonly understood risk 
factors” in order to advance the conversation 
and develop better interventions.21 
The criticism of the term is valid. However, the 
concept was only introduced in the 2020 Long 
Term Plan for the Norwegian Armed Forces 
for the first time. The slow adoption of the 
concept into policy and consideration arguably 
demonstrates its continued need as a tool of 
understanding why climate change is relevant 
to security and defense. This Insight will 
continually refer back to climate change as a 
threat multiplier while considering the variety 
of climate change implications that may affect 
the Norwegian Armed Forces. The first such 
implication, is the impact it might have on the 
military organization itself.
16 De Waal, 2007
17 Mazo, 2010: 35
18 Guy et al., 2020a: 8. See also page 12, 23, 24, 33, 48, 75, 
80, 123, 137, 139, 145. Several are related to countries’ 
acknowledgement of climate change as a threat multiplier.
19 Busby & von Uexkull, 2018
20 Busby & von Uexkull, 2018
21 Busby, 2020
Why should the Norwegian Armed Forces care about climate change?
© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2020. ISSN 1894-4795
IFS Insights 11-12/2020 4
Climate change and the military as an 
institution
Rickard Söder at the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, the Climate Change 
and Risk Programme, explores the impact 
climate change may have on the military as 
an organization.22 He asks whether variations 
of securitization of climate change impacts 
the armed forces’ structure and practices and 
argues that this is the case.23 He bases his 
analysis of both militaries on annual reports 
(2001-2018) on the militaries’ operations 
and initiatives.24 Söder uses subsets of 
securitization when analyzing the Norwegian 
and Swedish Armed Forces. These subsets 
are called threatification and riskification. 
Threatification is when an existential risk is 
considered more concrete, the object in danger 
(for instance the state) is more clearly defined, 
and the time horizon of threat is imminent.25 
Riskification does not have a clearly defined 
enemy, and the object at risk and its time 
horizon is less defined than in threatification.26 
Simply put, threatification is a process of seeing 
something as a danger that is more defined, 
and riskification is also a process of seeing 
something as a risk, but the risk is vague both 
in enemy and time. 
These are thoroughly explained, as he argues 
that climate change underwent a process of 
threatification in Norway, and a process of 
riskification in Sweden. Söder does not find 
much change in the Norwegian Armed Forces 
before and after threatification of climate 
change in the period between 2001 and 2018, 
besides more activity in Northern Norway.27 
He also finds that they are still mostly affected 
by the “extensive reorganization initiated in 
the early 2000s”.28 In Sweden, however, he 
found that there was a change from “a reaction 
defense heavily involved in international 
operations” to an “encompassing defense  
 
22 Söder, 2019: 2; Sipri, 2020
23 Söder, 2019: 7
24 Söder, 2019: 22, 30
25 Söder, 2019: 12
26 Söder, 2019: 12
27 Söder, 2019: 39
28 Söder, 2019: 39
emphasizing the national context” before and 
after riskification.29 
This change enables the Swedish Armed 
Forces to address broader security issues, 
which is how the process of riskification 
represents climate change. Official defense 
reports repeatedly state that security matters 
are “cross-sectional and erratic”, requiring 
a defense that can handle a multitude of 
challenges.30 This approach acknowledges 
the potential of climate change as a threat 
multiplier. The process of threatification 
in Norway however, did not reorient the 
Norwegian military organization towards the 
wider security implications of climate change. 
Söder finds that after threatification, the 
Norwegian Armed forces emphasized flexibility, 
fast response, and specialized competences, 
following the extensive reorganization of 
the early 2000s.31 Söder published his thesis 
in Spring 2019, and his findings therefore 
do not reflect that the 2020 Long Term Plan 
for Norway’s military acknowledges climate 
change as a threat multiplier and a future 
security implication. 
Climate change may also be a direct threat to 
the military itself, as the moral justification 
and room of operability in the public sphere 
may shrink if other ministries and areas of 
politics are forced to cut back due to climate 
change32. Especially if cuts to other sectors are 
made to justify emissions from the military’s 
operations. The military as an institution could 
in the future face pressure threatening its very 
legitimacy if it does not make efforts to emit 
less. In October 2019, a smattering of press 
attention from Dagsavisen, then Klassekampen, 
surrounded the increased emissions of the new 
F-35 fighter jets that are replacing the fleet 
of F-16 fighters.33 The Norwegian Ministry of 
Defense reasoned that most training would 
happen in simulators, and that the calculations 
connected to fuel usage are uncertain.34
29 Söder, 2019: 47
30 Söder, 2019: 47
31 Söder, 2019: 39
32 Brzoska, 2015: 178
33 Peck, 2019; Klassekampen, 2019
34 Sandberg, 2019
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In 2015 Professor Michael Brzoska 
conceptualized potential generalized military 
futures based on security policy and defense 
planning documents from 38 countries. These 
military futures show different directions of 
evolution for the military as an institution in a 
world besieged by climate change. A “leaner” 
military is considered as one of six possible 
“military futures” that may arise due to climate 
change.35 A leaner military future means a 
potential decrease in defense spending on the 
military due to climate change prioritizations.36 
It could also imply that carrying out national 
security and defense policies could be split 
between different civilian actors as well as 
through the military.37 
The other futures are envisioned as a “greener” 
military, where the military prioritizes 
cutting emissions; as climate change “victims” 
(destruction of installations and equipment 
due to climate change impacts such as a 
rising sea level). He also predicts futures 
such as armed “rescuers”, where the military 
will increasingly act as natural disaster 
management; armed “humanitarians” with 
more capacity for intervening in low-level 
violence brought on by climate change 
implications, and climate “warriors”, with more 
emphasis on fighting in wars brought on by 
climate change implications.38 It has also been 
argued that the only reason various militaries 
are engaging with climate change as a threat 
or a risk is because they want to bolster 
military spending, or to be legitimized by “the 
militarization of climate change”.39 
In 2012, Brzoska addressed the attitudes of 
the militaries of China, Russia, the UK and the 
US to climate change. He found that besides 
preparing for the potential consequences 
of climate change in the Arctic, the Russian 
military was not engaging with the issue 
of climate change.40 The Arctic is warming 
at double the global rate since the 1980s, 
35 Brzoska, 2015: 177
36 Brzoska, 2015: 179
37 Brzoska, 2015: 179
38 Brzoska, 2015: 179
39 Gilbert, 2012: 1-4
40 Brzoska, 2012: 49-50
resulting in unprecedented sea ice loss.41 
Norway, and other Arctic states such as Russia 
and the United States will be greatly affected by 
such implications as sea ice losses, completely 
changing the frame of reference for future 
security. 
The UK and US militaries also started efforts to 
cut energy use and greenhouse gas emissions, 
whereas the then low domestic energy prices 
mean Russia had not publicly addressed the 
climate change implications of emissions at 
the time.42 Russia has committed to low goals 
under the Paris Agreement, pledging to keep 
CO2 emissions lower than 70% of their level in 
1990, and the military has not been specifically 
mentioned.43 The US is studying the effect 
of rising sea levels on coastal installations, 
something the Chinese and UK militaries also 
are doing, due to the risk of damaging their 
ability to conduct military operations.44 The 
hard-core effects of climate change installations 
and equipment will be further explored in the 
next part. 
Climate change and military installations 
and equipment
Dangers to military installations and 
equipment due to climate change and the 
problem of improving installation resiliency 
have been frequently raised as a growing 
problem for the military around the world. 
In January 2016, the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) issued a directive assigning 
responsibilities on many levels to incorporate 
“climate considerations into planning for 
infrastructure and operations”.45 In January 
2017, the problem was also voiced by the Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command.46 Among 
other issues, the 2017 report updated criteria 
for facilities (UFCs) in order to prepare for 
climate implications. In the report “Report 
on Effects of a Changing Climate to the 
Department of Defense”, published by the U.S. 
Department of Defense in January 2019, a 
41  Agder et al., 2014: 776
42  Brzoska, 2012: 46-49
43  Paramonova, 2020
44  Brzoska, 2012: 46-48, 51
45  DoD, 2019: 3
46  DoD, 2019: 2
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concern was raised for the impact of climate 
change on installations and the need for their 
adaptation and increasing resilience.47 In 
August 2020, The U.S. Army released a 200+ 
page climate resilience handbook as climate 
will impact “installations, operational plans 
and overall missions”.48 In September 2020, 
the Secretary of the U.S. Army released a new 
policy to address threats by the changing 
climate and extreme weather to U.S. army 
installations.49 
Furthermore, climate change could amplify 
current natural dangers to military bases. The 
DoD highlights how climate change multiplies 
the threat of coastal flooding, where the sea 
level changes can magnify “the impacts of 
storm surge” and may eventually “result in 
permanent inundation of property”.50 Such 
hard-core implications to military installations 
is also highlighted in the Norwegian Long 
Term Plan of October 2020, which states that 
the military’s infrastructure, materials and 
logistics can be impacted by “rising sea levels, 
flooding, surface or urban runoff,51 strong 
winds, avalanches and landslides.52 It further 
states that climate change needs to be an object 
of consideration in the planning of installations, 
equipment, trainings and operations.53 These 
implications are recognized by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Defense in the Long Term Plan, 
yet the assessment is rather general in nature 
and appears to lack an examination of specific 
problems and implications of climate change 
on installations and equipment. 
One example of such specific research is an 
exploration of the possible consequences 
of climate change on U.S. military aircrafts, 
many of which the Norwegian Armed Forces 
use.54 A model developed by retired Air 
Force Colonel Mary McRae translates “future 
climate projections” into Density Altitude (DA) 
47 DoD, 2019: 4-10
48 Pinson et al., 2020: i
49 Secretary of the Army, 2020: 1
50 DoD, 2019: 4-10
51 Hard surfaces that do not allow water to trickle through the soil 
create urban or surface runoff.
52 Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020b: 42
53 Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020b: 125
54 Forsvaret, 2016; Forsvaret, 2017
measurements, which can be used to predict 
“specific changes in aircraft performance 
influenced by heat and humidity”.55 
Density Altitude, which can predict aircraft 
performance, is influenced by air temperature 
and dew point,56 which are projected to rise 
due to “anthropogenic climate change”.57 McRae 
notes that “the consequences of high DA can 
be catastrophic to aircraft performance”, which 
is why assessing the full spectrum of impacts 
on Density Altitude is vital.58 Hot, humid air, an 
increase in which is predicted as a consequence 
of anthropogenic climate change, causes the air 
to be less dense, which means “less available 
power for fixed and rotary wing aircraft[s]”.59 
An increase in higher Density Altitude in the 
future, without change to equipment and 
aircrafts, could result in a lesser transportation 
capacity in order to tackle a more difficult 
operational environment caused by climate 
change.60 Such a finding shows how specific 
climate change as a threat multiplier can get.
Climate change as a cause of armed conflict
Climate change can also multiply the threat and 
intensify reasons for armed conflict. The IPCC 
defines armed conflicts as those that “involve 
more than 25 battle-related deaths in a year” 
in the fifth assessment report of the IPCC.61 
This includes interstate, intrastate involving 
governments, non-state conflicts without 
direct government involvement, and one-sided 
conflicts “involving organized violence against 
civilians”.62 
The research focusing on modern day climate 
change and conflict uses climate variability 
and more specifically rainfall or temperature 
variability as representative measures for 
impacts that may occur more long term due 
to climate change.63 An overview from 2017 
finds that an increasing share of “quantitative 
55 Furtek, 2019: 1
56 “the atmospheric temperature (…) below which water droplets 
begin to condense and dew can form” (Lexico, 2020).
57 Villanova University, 2019 
58 Villanova University, 2019
59 Furtek, 2019: 2
60 Furtek, 2019: 2
61 Adger et al., 2014: 771
62 Adger et al., 2014: 771
63 Adger et al., 2014: 771
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studies find a link between weather anomalies 
and violence for some forms of violence, 
but the directions are not always consistent, 
and the mechanisms are not satisfactorily 
understood”.64 The threat multiplier concept 
therefore provides a commonality for these 
debates. The fifth IPCC assessment report, 
states in 2014 that “collectively the research 
does not conclude that there is a strong 
positive relationship between warming 
and armed conflict”.65 The IPCC report 
also concludes in the chapter devoted to 
human security that there is “high scientific 
agreement” that increased rivalry over shared 
resources is unlikely to “lead directly to 
warfare between states”.66
However, a more recent review of the literature 
in Nature magazine, includes 14 experienced 
and oft-cited authors in the field.67 They “agree 
that climate has affected organized armed 
conflict within countries”. Other drivers, such 
as low socioeconomic development, and 
low state capabilities are more important to 
conflict, and the causal mechanisms between 
climate and conflict remains uncertain.68 The 
uncertainty of the causal mechanisms between 
climate and conflict indicate that more 
research is necessary and shows the continued 
benefit of conceptualizing climate change as a 
threat multiplier. Future development of such 
conflicts could impact the Norwegian military 
commitments, both due to the conflict itself, 
and as help to our most important allies.69
Impact of climate change on Arctic security
The reduction of the Arctic icecap is 
among major topics raised in the debate 
on security implications of climate change, 
both internationally and in Norway. As 
Professor Rolf Tamnes notes, “the earliest 
and most intense climactic changes are being 
experienced in the Arctic region”.70 Indeed, it 
might be one of the first areas where climate 
64 Theisen, 2017: 210
65 Agder et al., 2014: 772
66  Agder et al., 2014: 772
67 Including Agder, one of the lead authors of the “Human 
Security” chapter in the 2014 IPCC report. 
68 Mach et al., 2019: 193
69 Mach et al., 2019: 197
70 Tamnes, 2011: 47
change will act as a threat multiplier for 
Norway.71 
In terms of actual physical changes to the 
Arctic, a Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment (FFI) report lists four changes: 
(1) polar ice melting, (2) sea level rise, (3) 
change in ocean currents, and (4) permafrost 
thaw and coastal erosion, leading to a 
more accessible Arctic.72 This development 
has several security implications: energy 
security implications due to the easier access 
to petroleum and gas reserves; increased 
shipping; increased military presence; and 
increased commercial fishing activity.73 
However, due to the cooperation between the 
Arctic states in the Arctic Council, it currently 
serves as the forum for hashing out disputes 
on “resource competition, new transportation 
practices, and boundary disputes”, and there is 
little chance of trouble.74 This does not mean 
that climate change and its effect on these 
issues will not challenge the Arctic states. 
The melting of the ice also presents an 
opportunity for an economic development for 
all Arctic states, as well as to “stimulate various 
actors to define and articulate their interests 
and policies” in the region.75 Russia will 
continue to be an actor in the Arctic that needs 
to be taken into account, due to its coverage 
of “nearly half of the latitudinal circle”, the 
High North’s continuing presence in Russian 
strategic thinking and defense policy, and the 
large Russian Arctic petroleum and resource 
stores, and planned commercial activity.76
There are three issues that have featured 
historically in Norway’s Arctic/High North 
policy. The first is managing the relationship 
with Russia (and formerly the USSR), the 
second is exercising authority over Svalbard 
as per the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, which is an 
issue that also deals with Russia.77 The third 
71 Tamnes, 2011: 47
72 Åtland, 2010: 24-28
73 Agder et al., 2014: 776; Tamnes, 2011: 47; Åtland, 2010: 30-42
74 Adger, 2014: 772; Tamnes, 2011: 47
75 Zysk, 2011: 98
76 Zysk, 2011: 85
77 Tamnes, 2011: 56-57
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is looking after Norway’s economic interests 
in the marine resources (both fishing and oil/
gas).78 All Arctic countries have an interest in 
the resources contained within, and it is clear 
that there are issues mentioned above that may 
cause friction. However, according to Professor 
Olav Schram Stokke, international institutions 
concerning the ocean and environmental 
governance have “raised security in the Arctic” 
and made the international order there stable 
by giving a forum for problem-solving.79 
Assistant Professor Rebecca Pincus highlights 
the strategic opportunities of the Arctic for 
both China and Russia due to climate change 
effects: the solution to the Malacca dilemma 
(fewer chokepoints along the shipping route) 
for the former, and great power status and 
economic power ambition for the latter.80 The 
interest in these strategic opportunities is 
reflected in China being granted permanent 
observer status by the Arctic council in 2013.81 
Increasing great power competition will 
therefore doubtlessly be affected by climate 
change, and in turn affect Norway. This could 
also affect NATOs relationship to the Arctic, 
and NATO in general.
Climate change and NATO
There is not as much research on NATO and 
climate change, as there is on some of the 
other topics, and the field could definitely be 
expanded. A security threat assessment of 
climate change for Europe and Russia finds 
that alliances that underlie security institutions 
may be threatened by “rising ethno-nationalist 
sentiments and migration waves” in a near 
term scenario, with a warming of 1-2 degrees 
Celsius.82 There is also little research on how 
climate change can impact international 
security cooperation, such as NATO, or even the 
UN. 
One of the few who has written about NATO 
and climate change, researcher Amar Causevic, 
assesses NATO’s perception of climate change 
as a security issue. There are variations 
78 Tamnes, 2011: 56-57
79 Stokke, 2014: 140
80 Pincus, 2020: 56
81 McGrath, 2013
82 Guy et al., 2020: 40
from member state to member state in the 
assessment of how “climate change-induced 
threats affect the socio-economic and political 
security of nation states”.83 Causevic, like many 
other experts on the climate-security nexus, 
defines climate change as a “non-traditional 
threat” that is capable of “multiplying and 
aggravating already existing problems(...) as 
well as generating fertile ground for future 
security threats”.84 He states that NATO first 
considered “environmental challenges” as 
potential threats to security in 1969, yet has 
only engaged with environmental and climate 
concerns in terms of environmental protection 
through the Environmental Protection 
Working Group (EPWG), and the Specialist 
Team on Energy Efficiency and Environmental 
Protection (STEEEP).85 
NATO’s Strategic Concept entitled “Active 
Engagement, Modern Defence” was published 
in 2010. It sets out their long-term view of 
NATO as an organization, and the security 
environment NATO would face. In it, NATO 
recognizes climate change as one of many 
aspects of the future security environment, 
and as something that will “further shape 
the future security environment in areas 
of concern to NATO and have the potential 
to significantly affect NATO planning and 
operations”.86 Moreover, climate change was 
also acknowledged as a “significant threat 
multiplier” by the NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly in 2014.87 There are national efforts 
by the American, British, Canadian and 
Norwegian member state governments on 
acknowledging and integrating climate change 
as a security issue in strategic documents and 
discussions.88 It might be difficult to further 
integrate climate security and initiatives as part 
of NATO’s policy and operations after Donald 
Trump’s official notice of withdrawal from the 
Paris Climate Agreement to the United Nations 
on November 4th, 2019.89 However, current 
83 Causevic, 2017: 59
84 Causevic, 2017: 65-66
85 Both NATO bodies; Causevic, 2017: 72
86 NATO, 2012
87 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2015
88 Causevic, 2017: 78
89 Causevic, 2017: 79; Pompeo, 2019
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President-elect Joe Biden has announced his 
intention to rejoin the Paris Agreement the first 
day of his presidency, signaling a more active 
role for the US on climate change.90
The Norwegian Prime Minister, Erna Solberg, 
stated that NATO’s envisioned role would 
be to “analyze the root causes for changes in 
security in different areas”, and encouraging 
political will around stopping climate change, 
rather than using the “defense part of NATO”.91 
Boris Ruge, former German diplomat and 
ambassador and Vice-Chairman of the Munich 
Security Conference, respectfully disagreed 
with Solberg, suggesting that it was exactly 
the military, analytical, assessment side of 
NATO that could help with the credibility of 
perceiving climate change as a security risk, 
if “military people write these things up”.92 
Ruge mentions the US as a serious military 
actor that understands and describes climate 
change as a threat by referencing the 2019 US 
DoD report (even with the US withdrawal from 
the Paris agreement). Yet NATO as a whole is 
made up of 30 different countries who all have 
different policies internally and externally on 
climate change in general, which complicates 
the common stance and policy on this issue.93 
Nevertheless, NATO Secretary General Jens 
Stoltenberg published in September 2020 
an op-ed in Die Welt, characterizing climate 
change as “one of the biggest challenges of our 
time”.94 
Climate change implications for NATO are 
also connected to the Arctic, which in turn has 
implications for Norway’s security and defense. 
In 2018, a joint force command in Norfolk, 
Virginia was established in order to “ensure 
alliance maritime security in the Atlantic”.95 
Due to Russia’s renewed capabilities in the 
Arctic and the north, their ability to “project 
power into the crucial strategic routes (...) 
into the North Atlantic and the Greenland-
Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap” could be assumed 
90 Harder, 2020
91 Atlantic Council, 2019
92 Atlantic Council, 2019
93 Atlantic Council, 2019
94 Stoltenberg, 2020
95 Garamone, 2018
to be the reason for the reestablishment of 
the NATO joint force command in Virginia.96 
Such organizational changes and capabilities 
could continue to be influenced by the security 
implications of the double rate of climate 
change in the Arctic, and thus changes in the 
regional strategic environment as a result. Such 
considerations show how multifaceted the 
security implications of climate change can be, 
and how climate change is fittingly described 
as a threat multiplier.
Climate change and Norway’s participation 
in international operations
The main research on Norway and security and 
defense and climate change has been focused 
on the Arctic and the high north, where climate 
change is accelerating at double the pace of the 
global average.97 However, for a small, northern 
state such as Norway, international operations 
will demand mastery of a completely different 
operational environment, as well as the 
inevitable logistics of allied cooperation. 
Combine this with climate change, intensifying 
the environmental and social challenges 
– whether they be drought, temperatures 
changes, floods, or increased social unrest and 
conflict – and envision the future of serving in 
international operations in countries ravaged 
by climate change. 
Western small powers have been largely 
replaced by non-western states in UN 
operations since the end of the 1990s-early 
2000s.98 However, resource-strong small 
powers may be called upon to increase their 
future participation, as small state participation 
has been “increasingly emphasized to a larger 
degree in both Brussels and Washington” as 
their economic limitations were increasing.99 In 
addition, they may be called upon to increase 
their participation in UN operations as their 
“coveted niche capacities” may contribute to 
UN forces operating more effectively – such as 
the Norwegian contribution of a transportation 
aircraft.100 There is a potential increase in 
96 Foggo & Fritz, 2018: 123
97 Norsk Polarinstitutt, 2018
98  jølberg, 2014: 47
99 Kjølberg, 2014: 53
100 Kjølberg, 2014: 53
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demand for Norwegian participation in UN 
operations related to climate change impacts, 
warranting a look at climate change predictions 
in current areas of operation for the Norwegian 
Armed Forces.
Africa
Norway’s main contribution to the United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) 
is a transportation aircraft (C-130J).101 It is 
clear that climate change is likely to affect 
the operational aspects of the Norwegian 
participation in future similar military 
operations given the above mentioned impact 
of temperatures and humidity on the efficiency 
of aircrafts.102 Higher temperatures and dew 
point103 combine to create a higher density 
attitude, which “can be catastrophic to aircraft 
performance” which can also pressure them 
to “reduce payload” in order to be effective.104 
One representative example of the detrimental 
effects of temperature on military aircrafts 
were the Black Hawk helicopters used in the 
raid on Osama Bin Laden in 2016; one was 
“critically damaged during a hard landing” 
due to the higher temperature of the enclosed 
compound.105 Even practicing the landings 
repeatedly, the helicopters reacted differently 
due to the changed temperature variable.106
There has been a move away from UN 
operations for Norway.107 It has been 
predicted that militaries will be more likely 
to handle humanitarian, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding operations connected to the 
threat multiplier effects of climate change.108 
The interrelationship “between the activities 
understood to reduce risk of conflict, and 
those needed for climate resilience” could be 
operationalized by the UNSC.109 A potential 
justification could be through UN Security 
101 Forsvaret, 2019
102  Villanova University, 2019
103 “the atmospheric temperature (…) below which water 
droplets begin to condense and dew can form” (Lexico, 2020).
104 Furtek, 2019: 4; Villanova University, 2019
105 Furtek, 2019: 4
106 Furtek, 2019: 4
107 Kjølberg, 2014: 47
108 Scott & Khan, 2016: 87
109 Scott & Khan, 2016: 87
Council resolution 1625 on strengthening the 
UNSCs role in conflict prevention.110 
Asia
Afghanistan straddles the Middle East and 
Asia and has been ranked as one of the most 
vulnerable countries to climate change, due 
to its low capacity for adaptation, and high 
“exposure to climate fluctuations”.111 This low 
capacity for adaptation is due to the effects 
of conflict in Afghanistan for the past four 
decades, resulting in poor infrastructure and 
institutions, underdevelopment, and poverty.112 
In Afghanistan there is uncertainty around the 
effect of climate change, as there is so little 
research.113 Even with a changing climate, 
the Norwegian national report “A Good Ally: 
Norway in Afghanistan 2001-2014” found that 
the ability to adapt had been “substantial” for 
the Norwegian Armed Forces on the practical 
and technical level, in weapons, protection and 
security gear and clothing.114 
There is little specificity in the report 
otherwise, stating that most of the learning 
that was retained in the military organization 
was on the practical and tactical levels.115 The 
Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan did 
show that it would be difficult to have different 
equipment for all “imaginable operational 
types and environments in international 
operations”.116 The fragility of Afghanistan’s 
institutions, infrastructure and development 
could be severely affected by climate change as 
a threat multiplier, and both environmental and 
social challenges would likely arise. If climate 
change impacts security for the worse, it is 
plausible to imagine a demand from NATO for a 
higher force contribution in Afghanistan.117
110 UNSCR 1625 is on strengthening the UN Security Council’s role 
in preventing armed conflict, which could be operationalized 
for climate change action in the face of armed conflict that is 
perceived to be caused by climate change; Scott & Khan, 2016: 
87
111 Aich et al., 2017: 2
112 Aich et al., 2017: 2
113 Aich et al., 2017: 2
114 NOU 2016: 8, 57
115 NOU 2016: 8, 57
116 Daltveit, 2014: 165
117 Forsvaret, 2020
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Middle East
In the Middle East, “upward temperature 
trends” are deemed as “notable and robust” 
in the past few decades by the IPCC.118 There 
is little research on issues such as water 
scarcity, but according to Kohler et al., 36 % of 
a selection of refugees in Germany interviewed 
from Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan, 
reported the beginning or “a significant 
increase of electricity and water scarcity, or 
both, after violence started in their place of 
origin”.119 As there is shaky evidence on the 
effect of climate change on water scarcity, or 
loss of precipitation or desertification in West 
Asia, it is harder to predict how Norwegian 
soldiers could be affected in these areas of 
operation. 
One implication is the possibility of Norwegian 
soldiers operating in higher temperatures, as 
the upward temperature trends are robust. 
This could then lead to the aforementioned 
temperature effect on aircrafts. In Iraq more 
specifically, infrastructure and the political 
situation is much less stable to enact adaptive 
measures than for instance in Israel due to 
their differences in development. If there is a 
danger of increased water scarcity in Iraq due 
to climate change and bad infrastructure, the 
controlling and denying of such resources in 
conflict would be multiplied by the effects of 
climate change. During the 2020 NATO summer 
training exercise in Iraq, “temperatures 
regularly exceeded 50 degrees”.120 Being 
able to transport resources such as water or 
electricity may become even more important 
to Norwegian forces in international military 
operations in such areas in the future. 
Changes in the European natural 
environment – implications for 
international operations
All of Norway’s European contributions, 
whether big or small, cover various areas and 
environments in Europe, and include land, 
air and sea forces. For air and sea forces, the 
major climate effects and vulnerabilities are 
118 Hijioka, 2014: 1333
119 Kohler et al., 2019: 5
120 Stoltenberg, 2020
linked to installations, infrastructure and 
equipment. There is a high confidence that sea 
level rise and “increases in extreme rainfall” are 
projected to increase flood risk in Europe.121 
There is also high confidence of a significant 
increase in “high temperature extremes” in 
Europe, along with increasing precipitation in 
Northern Europe and decreased precipitation 
in Southern Europe.122 The adaptation 
capacity is however much higher in Europe, 
thus military operations in most of Europe 
could most likely rely on adaptation measures 
enacted by the various states. However, this is 
not a certainty, and it is hard to predict how 
climate shocks, and steady climate trends 
such as increasing temperature, will interact 
with socioeconomic circumstances of various 
European countries.123 The implications – and 
changes in the military equipment and the way 
they operate – may be more significant than 
what the current state of knowledge allows us 
to predict. 
Climate change and security: knowledge 
gaps
The potential implications of climate 
change for the Norwegian Armed Forces in 
international operations covered in this article 
is brief. There is need for more research on 
this topic. Climate change is a knowable threat, 
insofar that we know that human activities 
“have caused approximately 1.0 C of global 
warming above pre-industrial levels”, and that 
global warming is “likely to reach 1.5 C between 
2030 to 2052 if it continues to increase at the 
current rate”.124 Not preparing nor researching 
the possible security implications of climate 
change, which is already happening, and will 
continue, is wishful thinking. The following 
section summarizes the knowledge gaps that 
have not been mentioned already. 
As Ole Jacob Sending, Indra Øverland, and 
Thomas Boe Hornburg suggest, there are five 
broad areas of research that are key “to better 
understand how climate change will reshape 
world politics: sovereignty, security, status 
121 Kovats et al., 2014: 1271
122 Kovats et al., 2014: 1270
123 Kovats et al., 2014: 1273
124 IPCC, 2018: 4
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and reputation, norms and coalitions, and the 
geopolitics of energy”.125 This five-pronged 
research agenda provides a useful structure for 
knowledge gaps that should be addressed, even 
if the list is non-exhaustive. 
Security
Security cooperation and security alliances 
are not global. They are usually regional 
and rooted in historical polarities. How will 
cooperation on climate change affect such 
security alliances, like NATO, for a small 
country such as Norway? Will there be a 
development in other security alliances, such 
as with the EU, due to the internal politics 
of the United States (climate change denier 
Donald Trump as the current commander-
in-chief, though not for long)? Or will the 
need for a strong ally for Norway as a small 
state, override climate change cooperation, 
wherein our security relationships are put 
above the threat of climate change and the 
work to mitigate it? Hard-core climate change 
implications should be further investigated, 
such as possible consequences to military 
installations and equipment.
Norms and coalitions
Will there be more defined climate change 
norms that are possible to violate? How will 
the climate change world politics and the 
distribution of moral responsibility affect 
the structure and purpose of Norway’s 
Armed Forces, its security policy, and its 
security alliances? Kate Guy is currently 
pursuing a PhD at Oxford University focusing 
on the impact of climate change shocks on 
the international system, national security 
and global governance.126 The connection 
between security, international cooperation, 
global governance and climate change is little 
explored, and should be further explored, 
especially from the perspective of a small state 




125 Sending et al., 2020: 183
126 DPIR, 2020
Geopolitics of energy
Norway’s oil reserves have given the country 
riches beyond what its size would indicate. 
Norway has used this money to prop up 
foreign, security, and aid policies, which 
could be in jeopardy if one of the “world’s 
main commodities” is phased out.127 How will 
Norway ensure security in an oil free world? 
How will this change power balances?
Research such as McRae’s finding that 
predicted anthropogenic climate change 
and higher temperatures will affect Density 
Altitude, which in turn will affect Hercules 
C-103J’s performance, is the kind of vital 
knowledge and consideration that can benefit 
military planning. Large picture thinking 
on how climate change could change great 
power politics is also important for long-term 
strategic thinking. The future challenges of 
climate change demand interdisciplinary 
attention, which it has not received enough 
of in security and defense fields. Failure to 
consider climate change does not mean it will 
not happen.
127 Sending et al., 2020: 186
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